Compensated variation in random utility models by Dagsvik, John K.
Discussion Papers No. 299, June 2001
Statistics Norway, Research Department
John K. Dagsvik
Compensated Variation in
Random Utility Models
Abstract:
In this paper we introduce the notion of random expenditure function and derive the distribution of the
expenditure function and corresponding compensated choice probabilities in the general case when
the (random) utilities are nonlinear in income. We also derive formulae for expenditure and choice
under price (policy) changes conditional on the initial utility level. This is of particular interest for
welfare measurement because it enables the researcher to analyze the distribution of Compensating
variation.
Keywords: Random expenditure function, Compensated choice probabilities, Compensating
variation.
JEL classification: C25, D61
Acknowledgement: The first draft of this paper was written while the author was visiting the
Stockholm School of Economics in the spring semester of 1999. I wish to thank Mårten Palme,
Anders Karlström, Tor Jakob Klette and Steinar Strøm for useful discussions and comments that
have improved the paper.
Address: John K. Dagsvik, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: john.dagsvik@ssb.no
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. As a preprint a
Discussion Paper can be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article by in-
cluding intermediate calculation and background material etc.
Abstracts with downloadable PDF files of
Discussion Papers are available on the Internet: http://www.ssb.no
For printed Discussion Papers contact:
Statistics Norway
Sales- and subscription service
N-2225 Kongsvinger
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95
E-mail: Salg-abonnement@ssb.no
31. Introduction
In this paper we introduce the notion of the expenditure function and compensated demand within the
theory of discrete choice. Since the theory of discrete choice is based on a random utility formulation,
it follows that the corresponding expenditure function is random. In the context of measuring the
welfare effect of changing prices or non-pecuniary attributes it is useful to apply the expenditure
function to derive Equivalent Variation and Compensating Variation (cv). When the (random) utility
function is nonlinear in income analytic formulae for the distribution of cv has so far not been
available. See Herriges and Kling (1999) for a review of the state of the art as well as previous
contributions. McFadden (1995) has developed a Monte Carlo simulator for computing cv in random
utility models and Herriges and Kling (1999) have investigated the empirical consequences of
nonlinear income effects based on a particular empirical application.1 Aaberge et al. (1995) have used
a Monte Carlo simulation to compute equivalent variation.
By using the stochastic structure of random expenditure function as a point of departure
we demonstrate in this paper that one can obtain explicit analytic formulae for the distribution of cv
for general random utility models. In the case where the model belongs to the Generalized Extreme
Value class the formulae become particularly simple.
Let us briefly review the definition of cv in random utility models with particular focus
on the challenge of calculating the distribution of cv. Let Uj denote the utility of alternative j and
assume that
( )j j j jU v w , y= + ε ,
where y represents income, wj is price or a vector of attributes including price associated with
alternative j, jv ( ), j 1,2,...,⋅ = are deterministic functions and j, j 1,2,...,ε = are random terms with joint
distribution that does not depend on the structural terms { }jv ( )⋅ .2 Then (ignoring the choice set in the
notation) cv is defined implicitly through
( )( ) ( )( )0 0 1 0j j j j j j j jmax v w , y max v w , y cv+ ε = + + ε
1 I recently became aware of the work by Karlström (1999), who has independently obtained many of the same results as in
this paper, although the proofs are different.
2 Note that the present notation accommodates the specification ( ) ( )j j 1j 2 jv w ,y v w , y w= −% where the function v% does not
depend on j and w1j represents non-pecuniary attributes and w2j the price (or user cost) associated with alternative j.
4where { }0 0jw , y represent initial attributes and income, and { }1jw are the attributes implied by the
policy. Here it is assumed that the random terms { }jε are not affected by the policy intervention.
Clearly, cv becomes a random variable that depends on all the error terms and all the attributes and
initial income. From an analytic point of view the difficulty of attaining a formulae for the distribution
of cv stems from the fact that when the new attributes { }1jw are introduced then the alternative that
yields maximum utility may be different from the one that maximized utility initially. In other words,
the individual agent may switch from the alternative chosen initially to a new one, when the policy is
introduced. If, however, the random terms initially and after the intervention are stochastically
independent, then the complexity of the problem reduces drastically.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the discrete choice framework is
presented, and in Section 3 compensating choice probabilities and the random expenditure function are
defined and the corresponding distribution functions are derived. In Section 4 we derive compensated
choice probabilities and the distribution of the expenditure function under price changes conditional
on a utility level equal to the initial level under different assumptions about the random terms of the
utility function.
2. The setting
We consider a setting in which a consumer faces a set B of feasible alternatives (products), which is a
subset of the universal set S of alternatives, { }S M= 0 1 2, , ,... , , where 0 indexes the alternative "no
purchase". The consumers utility function of alternative j is assumed to have the form
(1) ( )U v w yj j j j= +, ε
where y denotes income and wj is a vector of attributes including price of alternative j. The function
vj(⋅) is assumed to be continuous, decreasing in the first argument and strictly increasing in the second,
and may depend on j. For notational simplicity non-pecuniary attributes are suppressed in the notation.
Let FB(⋅) denote the joint cumulative distribution function of { }Bk,k ∈ε . We assume that
)(F)(F S ⋅≡⋅ possesses a density. Thus the probability of ties is zero. Then it is well known that one can
express the Marshallian choice probabilities by a simple formulae. For notational simplicity, let
{ }B 0,1,2,...,m= . Then the Marshallian choice probabilities are given by
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )Bj j k j 0 0 1 1 m mk BP B, y, P U max U F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y du∈≡ = = − − −∫w
5where ( )m21Bj x,...,x,xF denotes the partial derivative with respect to xj and ( )M21 w,...,w,w=w .
Here it is understood that income and prices, (y,w) are given.
If { }ε j are random variables with multivariate extreme value distribution, then GB
defined by
(3) ( )( ) ( ) 



≤ε≡−
∈
w,yxPx...,,x,xGexp kk
Bk
M10
B I
has the property3
(4) ( ) ( )zx...,,zx,zxGex...,,x,xG M10SzM10S −−−= −
for z R∈ . The corresponding Marshallian choice probability is given by
(5) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
B
j 0 0 1 1 m m
j B
0 0 1 1 m m
G v w , y , v w , y ,..., v w , y
P B, y, .
G v w , y , v w , y ,..., v w , y
− − −
= −
− − −
w
This formulae is well known and is found in a complete analogous form in for example McFadden
(1981).
3. The random expenditure function and compensated (Hicksian)
choice probabilities
We now proceed to discuss the notion of expenditure function that corresponds to the above setting.
Let YB(w,u) be the expenditure function defined as
(6) ( )( )Y u z v w z uB k B k k k( , ) :max , .w = + = ∈ ε
The expenditure function can be readily computed as follows. Let ( )kY w ,u,k be determined by
( )( )k k k kv w ,Y w ,u,k u .= − ε
Due to the fact ( )k kv w , y is strictly increasing in y, ( )kY w ,u,k is uniquely determined. We realize
that the expenditure function equals
3 In addition G must satisfy a number of regularity conditions to ensure that exp(-G(x0,x1,...,xM)) is a proper distribution
function, cf. McFadden (1978).
6( ) ( )B kk BY ,u min Y w ,u,k .∈=w
With probabililty one the set Y(w,u) is a singleton because for z z≠ * , we have
( )( ) ( )( )( )P v w z v w zk B k k k k B k k kmax , max , .*∈ ∈+ = + =ε ε 0
We thus obtain the next result.
Theorem 1
Let { }B 0,1,2,... ,m= . The distribution of the expenditure function is given by
( ) ( ) ( )( )v v v≤ = − − − −BB 0 0 1 1 m mP Y ( ,u) y 1 F u w ,y ,u (w ,y),...,u w ,yw
where FB(⋅) denotes the joint distribution of { }Bk,k ∈ε .
A proof of Theorem 1 is given in the appendix.
As mentioned above, the notion of Hicksian- or compensated choice probabilities does
not seem to have appeared previously in the literature. Below we propose a natural definition.
Definition 1
By Hicksian choice probabilities, ( ){ }hjP B,u,w , we mean
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )( )v vhj j j B j k k B kk BP B,u, P w ,Y ,u max w ,Y ,u .ε ε∈≡ + = +w w w
The interpretation of ( )hjP B,u,w is as the probability of choosing j B∈ given that the
utility level is given and equal to u. For example, if prices change the consumers are given income
compensation so as to maintain a given utility level.
7Theorem 2
The Hicksian choice probabilities can be expressed as
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
v v v v v v v
.
v v v
h
j
B B
j 0 0 1 1 m m k 0 0 1 1 m m k kk B
B
k 0 0 1 1 m m0
k B
P B,u,
F u w ,y ,u w ,y ,...,u w , y F u w ,y ,u w ,y ,...,u w , y w ,dy
F u w ,y ,u w ,y ,...,u w , y
∞
∈
∈
− − − − − −
=
− − −
∑
∫ ∑
w
A proof of Theorem 2 is given in the appendix.
From Theorem 2 we realize that one can calculate the Hicksian choice probabilities
readily provided the cumulative distribution FB(⋅) is known since only a one dimensional integral is
involved in the formulae for ( )hjP B,u,w .
Theorem 3
Suppose F(⋅) is a multivariate extreme value distribution. Then the Hicksian choice
probabilities are given by
( ) ( ) ( )( )hj j B
0
P B,u, P B,y, P Y ,u dy .
∞
= ∈∫w w w
A proof of Theorem 3 is given in the appendix.
The reason for the simplification of the Hicksian choice probabilities expressed in
Theorem 3 is that when the error terms in the utility function are multivariate extreme value
distributed then the indirect utility is stochastically independent of which alternative that is chosen.
4. The probability distribution of the expenditure function and
the choice under price changes conditional on the initial utility
level
We shall next consider the problem of characterizing the Hicksian choice probabilities when the utility
level equals the (indirect) utility under prices and income that differ from the current prices and
incomes. To this end we consider a two period setting. In period one (the initial period) the prices and
8income are ( )00 y,w . In the second period (current period) the prices are w. As above, it is assumed
that the respective random terms remain unchanged under price changes. In general, when prices (or
other attributes) change it may yield a decrease or an increase in the agent’s indirect utility. However,
the highest utility may no longer be attained at the alternative chosen initially, and consequently the
agent will switch to a new alternative, namely the one that maximizes utility under the new price
regime. In the current setting, however, the (indirect) utility level is kept fixed and equal to the initial
level. But the agent may still switch from the initially chosen alternative to a new one because, after
the price changes, the utility of the initially chosen alternatives may no longer coincide with the new
indirect utility.
Let us first consider the distribution of ( )( )00B y,V,Y ww , where
(7) ( ) ( )( )k00kkBk00 y,wvmaxy,V ε+= ∈w .
The interpretation of ( )( )00B ,yV,Y ww is as the expenditure function conditional on the utility level
that corresponds to income level y0. Hence, the corresponding Compensating variation measure equals
( )( )0 00 By Y ,V , y− w w .
Let ( )00B y,J w denote the initial choice from B and let ( )* 0 0BJ , y ,w w denote the current
choice from the choice set B, given the current and initial prices and income ( )00 y,, ww , and given
that the current utility level equals the initial one, ( )00 y,V w .
Theorem 4
Let
( ) ( ) ( )( )00jjjjj00jj y,w,y,wmaxy,w,y,wh vv= .
Then
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )v
∈ = =
= − − −∫
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
j j ij 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
P Y ,V ,y dy,J , y i,J , y j
w ,dy F u h w ,y ,w ,y ,u h w ,y ,w , y ,...,u h w ,y ,w ,y du
w w w w ,w
when ≠i j , ∈i, j B and ( ) ( )≤0 0 0 0jj j j ii i iy w , y ,w y < y w ,y ,w , where ( )0 0ii i iy w , y ,w is determined by
( ) ( )( )v v=0 0 0 0i i i i ii i iw , y w ,y w ,y ,w . Otherwise
9( )( ) ( ) ( )( )∈ = = =0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B BP Y ,V , y dy, J , y i, J , y , j 0w w w w w .
For = ∈j i B ,
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )= = = =0 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0B B B iP Y ,V ,y y, J , y J , y i P B, y ,w w w w ,w w
for ( ), ,= 0 0ii i iy y w y w , and
( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), , , , , ,∈ = = =0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B BP Y V y dy J y J y i 0w w w w w
for ( ), ,≠ 0 0ii i iy y w y w .
A proof of Theorem 4 is given in the appendix.
The result of Theorem 4 shows that only a one-dimensional integral is needed to calculate
the joint probability density of
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B BY ,V , y , J , y , J , y ,w w w w w
provided ( )ij 1 2 mF x ,x ,..., x is known. However, in the multinomial Probit case where the utility
function has normally distributed random components, a m 2− dimensional integral is needed to
calculate ( )ij 1 2 mF x ,x ,..., x .
The next result follows immediately from Theorem 4 by summing over Bj∈ and
integrating with respect to y.
Corollary 2
The joint distribution of ( )( )0BY ,V ,yw w and ( )0 0BJ , yw is given by
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
> =
= − − −∫
0 0 0 0
B B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
P Y ,V ,y y,J , y i
F u h w ,y ,w ,y ,u h w ,y ,w ,y ,...,u h w ,y ,w ,y du
w w w
for ( ).∈ ≤ < 0 0ii i ii B, and 0 y y w ,y ,w
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The next corollary follows from Corollary 2 by summing over i B∈ .
Corollary 3
The c.d.f. of ( )( )0 0BY ,V ,yw w is given by
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )\∈= − − −∑ ∫0 0
0 0
B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
i B C y ,y, ,
P Y ,V ,y > y
F u h w ,y ,w ,y ,u h w ,y ,w ,y ,...,u h w ,y ,w ,y du
w w
w w
for ≥y 0 , where
( ) ( ) ( ){ }, , , : v , v , ,= ≥ ∈0 0 0 0k k k kC y y k w y w y k Bw w .
The results obtained in Theorem 4 and Corollaries 2 and 3 are derived under the
assumption that the choice set B is the same before and after the price change. However, these results
also apply in cases where the choice set changes. Suppose for example that alternative 2 was available
initially but is removed as part of a policy intervention. One can conveniently accommodate for this by
letting w2 become very large so that ( )2 2v w , y becomes very small. As a result we obtain that
( ) ( )0 0 02 2 2 2 2h w , y,w , y v w , y=
and that
( )0 02 C y , y, ,∉ w w .
From Corollary 3 it follows that the mean and variance of ( )( )0 0BY ,V , yw w can be
calculated by the formulae
(8)
( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
0 0
ii i i
0 0
B
y w ,y ,w
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
i B 0
E Y ,V , y
= F u h w , y , w , y ,u h w , y ,w , y ,...,u h w , y ,w , y du dy,
∈
− − −∑ ∫ ∫
w w
and
11
(9)
( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
0 0
ii i i
2
0 0
B
y w ,y ,w
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
i B 0
E Y ,V , y
= 2 y F u h w , y ,w , y ,u h w , y ,w , y ,...,u h w , y ,w , y du dy.
∈
− − −∑ ∫ ∫
w w
We shall next discuss how the general results obtained above simplify in the case where
F(⋅) is a multivariate extreme value distribution. This includes nested logit type models. For simplicity,
we only state the joint density of
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0 * 0 0B B BY ,V , y , J , y , J , y ,w w w w w
for the case when
( ) ( )0 0 * 0 0B BJ , y J , y , .≠w w w
Corollary 4
Suppose F(⋅) is a multivariate extreme value distribution. Then
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B
B B B B 0 0
i j ij j j m
B
P Y ,V , y dy,J , y i,J , y j
G G G G h w ,y ,w ,dy
G
∈ = =
−
=
% % % %
%
w w w w ,w
when ( ) ( )≠ ∈ ≤0 0 0 0jj j j ii i ii j, i, j B and y w ,y ,w y < y w ,y ,w , where
( ) ( ) ( )( )= − − − −% B B 0 0 0 0 0 00 0 0 1 1 1 m m mG logF h w ,y ,w , y , h w ,y ,w ,y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y ,
( ) ( ) ( )( )= − − −% B B 0 0 0 0 0 0i i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m mG G h w ,y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w ,y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y ,
( ) ( ) ( )( )= − − −% B B 0 0 0 0 0 0ij ij 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m mG G h w ,y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w ,y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y ,
and GB(⋅) is defined in (3).
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Thus, the result of Corollary 4 implies that in the case where the random terms are
multivariate extreme value distributed, one can rather easily compute the joint density of the
expenditure function and JB and *BJ .
The next corollaries follow directly from Corollary 4.
Corollary 5
Suppose F(⋅) is a multivariate extreme value distribution. Then we have, for ∈i B , and
( )0 0ii i i0 y y w ,y ,w≤ <
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) .
> =
− − −
=
− − −
0 0 0 0
B B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
P Y ,V ,y y,J , y i
G h w ,y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w ,y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y
G h w ,y ,w ,y , h w ,y ,w ,y ,..., h w ,y ,w ,y
w w w
Corollary 6
Suppose F(⋅) is a multivariate extreme value distribution, then
( )( )( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
∈
>
=
∑
0 0
0 0
B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
i B\C y ,y, ,
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
P Y ,V ,y y
G -h w ,y ,w ,y ,-h w ,y ,w ,y ,...,-h w , y ,w ,y
G -h w ,y ,w ,y ,-h w ,y ,w ,y ,...,-h w ,y ,w ,y
w w
w w
for ≥y 0 .
From eq. (8) and Corollary 6 we obtain that
(10)
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )0 0ii i i
0 0
B
y w ,y ,w B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i B 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
EY ,V , y
G h w , y ,w , y , h w , y ,w , y ,..., h w , y ,w , y dy
.
G h w , y ,w , y , h w , y ,w , y ,..., h w , y , w , y∈
− − −
=
− − −
∑ ∫
w w
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Corollary 7
Suppose ,...,,, M10 εεε are independent and extreme value distributed. Then for ∈i B ,
and ( )0 0ii i i0 y y w ,y ,w≤ <
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) .y,w,y,wmaxexp
y,wexp
iy,Jy,yV,YP 00
kkkk
Bk
00
ii00
B
00
B
vv
v
, ∑
∈
==> www
From Corollary 7 we obtain the next result:
Corollary 8
Suppose , ,...,0 1 Mε ε ε , are independent and extreme value distributed. Then
( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
v
,
v v
0 0
0 0
i i
i B\C y ,y, ,0 0
B 0 0
k k k k
k B
exp w ,y
P Y ,V y y
exp max w ,y , w ,y
∈
∈
> =
∑
∑
w w
w w
for 0y ≥ .
From eq. (8) and Corollary 8 we obtain that
(11) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( )0 0ii i iy w ,y ,w
0 0 0 0
B i i 0 0
i B 0 k k k k
k B
dyE Y ,V , y exp v w , y .
exp max v w , y ,v w , y∈
∈
=∑ ∫ ∑w w
Corollary 9
Suppose M10 ,...,, εεε , are independent and extreme value distributed. Then
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )
( )( )
v
v
∈
= = = = ∑
0 0
j j* 0 0 0 0 0 0
B B j
k k
k C y ,y, ,
exp w ,y
P J , , y j Y ,V , y y P C y ,y, , , , y
exp w ,y
w w
w w w w w w w
for ∈j B and ( )≥ 0 0jj j jy y w ,y ,w .
A proof of Corollary 9 is given in the appendix.
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We realize that the results of Corollaries 5 to 9 are quite tractable from a computation
viewpoint.
From Corollary 9 the next result is immediate.
Corollary 10
Assume that ,,...,, M10 εεε are independent and extreme value distributed. Then for
( )≥ 0 0jj j jy y w ,y ,w
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ),∞= = ∈∫* 0 0 0 0 0 0B j B
0
P J , y j P C y ,y, , , y, P Y ,V y dyw ,w w w w w w
and the distribution of ( )( )00B yV,Y ,ww is given by Corollary 8.
Example
Consider a nested logit model with 4 alternatives where
( ) ( )0 31 2x xx x0 1 2 3G x ,x ,x ,x e e e e− − θ− − θ= + + +
where ( ]0,1θ∈ and 21− θ has the interpretation as the correlation between the error terms of the
utilities of alternatives two and three. We then get
( )
( ) ( )
i
0 31 2
h
i 0 1 2 3
h hh h
0 1 2 3
G h , h , h , h e
G h , h , h , h e e e e θθ
− − − −
=
− − − − + + +
for { }i 0,1 ,∈ and
( )
( )
( )
( )
32 i
0 31 2
1hh h
i 0 1 2 3
h hh h0 1 2 3
e e eG h , h , h , h
G h , h , h , h e e e e
θ−θθ θ
θθθ
+
− − − −
=
− − − − + + +
for { }i 2,3∈ , where hj is given in Theorem 4. By Corollaries 5 and 6 we can calculate the
corresponding distributions of the expenditure function and initial choice.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper we have demonstrated that the notion of random expenditure function and compensated
choice probabilities can be readily adapted within a discrete choice setting. When the model belongs to
the Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) class then the formulae for the compensated choice
probabilities simplifies. Since Dagsvik (1995) has demonstrated that a general random utillity model
can be approximated arbitrarily closely by models belonging to the GEV family, the GEV setting
represents no loss of generality. We have also demonstrated that one can obtain analytic formulae for
the distribution of Compensating Variation. Also in this case the formulae simplifies when the model
belongs to the GEV class. Although we have focused on Compensating Variation in this paper, the
derivation of the distribution of Equivalent Variation is completely analogous.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1:
Since
( )( )kkkBk y,wvmax ε+∈
is increasing in y with probability one, we get that
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
B k k kk B
k k k
k B
B
0 0 1 1 m m
P Y ( ,u) y P max v w , y u
P v w , y u
F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y .
∈
∈
 > = + ε <  
 
= + ε <  
=
− − −
w
I
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Due to the fact that
( ){ } ( )( ){ }B k k kk BY , y y max v w , y u ,∈= ⇔ + ε =w
we have that
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
j j j j k k k Bk B
j j j k k kk B
B
j 0 0 1 1 m m
B
k 0 0 1 1 m m
k B
(y) P v w , y max v w , y Y ,u y
P v w , y u max v w , y u
F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y
.
F u v w , y ,u v w , y ,...,u v w , y
∈
∈
∈
ψ ≡ + ε = + ε =
= + ε = + ε =
− − −
=
− − −∑
w
Hence
( ) ( )( )j j B
0
P B,u, (y)P Y ,u dy .
∞
= ψ ∈∫w w
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Hence, by inserting for ψj(y) and the distribution of YB(w,u) given in Theorem 1 we obtain the result
of Theorem 2.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 3:
We have that
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )hj j j j k k k B Bk BP B,u, P v w , y max v w , y Y ,u y P Y ,u dy .∈= +ε = +ε = ∈∫w w w
Now recall that by Strauss (1979) and Lindberg et al. (1995) the multivariate extreme value
distribution has the property that ( )( )max ,k B k k kv w y∈ + ε is independent of which alternative that
maximizes utility. Hence due to the fact that
( ){ } ( )( ){ }Y u y v w y uB k B k k kw, max , .= ⇔ + =∈ ε
we obtain that
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )( )
P v w y v w y Y u y
P v w y v w y
j j j k B k k k B
j j j k B k k k
, max , ,
, max ,
+ = + =
= + = +
∈
∈
ε ε
ε ε
w
Thus, the result of Theorem 3 follows.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Let
(A.1) ( ) ( )( )0 01 k k kk C y ,y, ,Z (y) max v w , y ,∈= + εw w
(A.2) ( ) ( )( )0 0 02 k k kk B\C y ,y, ,Z (y) max v w , y∈= + εw w ,
(A.3) ( ) ( )( )0 0 00 0 01 k k kk C y ,y, ,Z max v w , y∈= + εw w
and
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(A.4) ( ) ( )( )0 0 00 0 02 k k kk B\C y ,y, ,Z max v w , y∈= + εw w .
Note that 011 Z)y(Z ≥ and 02 2Z (y) Z< with probability one. Hence
(A.5)
( )( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }
( )( ) ( )( ){ } { }
0 0 0 0
B 1 2 1 2
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2
Y ,V , y y max Z (y),Z (y) max Z ,Z
Z (y) max Z ,Z Z (y) max Z ,Z Z (y) Z .
≤ = ≥
⇔ ≥ ∪ ≥ ⇔ ≥
w w
Similarly, we get that
(A.6) ( )( ){ } { }.Z)y(Zyy,V,Y 02100B <⇔>ww
Accordingly,
(A.7) ( )( ){ } { }.Z)y(Zyy,V,Y 02100B =⇔=ww
Furthermore,
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ){ }
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }.Z)y(Z)y(Z),y(Zmaxy,wvZ,Zmaxy,wv
Z)y(Zjy,Jiy,J
yr,V,Yjy,,Jiy,J
0
2121jjj
0
2
0
1i
00
ii
0
21B
00
B
0
B
00*
B
00
B
=∩=ε+∩=ε+=
=∩=∩==
=∩=∩=
ww
wwwww
Next note that when 021 Z)y(Z = ,
( ) ( ) 0211010201 Z)y(Z)y(Z,ZmaxZ,Zmax ===
and
( ) ( ) .)y(ZZ)y(Z,Zmax)y(Z),y(Zmax 10220221 ===
Hence
(A.8) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }( )( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }.)y(ZZ)y(Zy,wvZy,wv
)y(ZZ)y(Z),y(Zmaxy,wvZ,Zmaxy,wv
1
0
21jjj
0
2i
00
ii
1
0
221jjj
0
2
0
1i
00
ii
=∩=ε+∩=ε+=
=∩=ε+∩=ε+
But (A.8) implies that for ji ≠
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( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) { }( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B
0 0 0 0 0
i i i 2 j j j 2 j j j k k k 2
k C y ,y, , \ j
0 0 0 0
i i i k k k j j j j j
k B\ C y ,y, , \ j
P Y ,V , y y, y y , J , y i, J , , y j
P v w , y Z , v w , y y Z v w , y , max v w , y Z o y
P v w , y du, v w , y u, v w , y y u v w , ymax
∈
∈
∈ + ∆ = =
+= ε = + ∆ + ε ≥ ≥ + ε + ε ≤ + ∆
+ ε ∈ + ε ≤ + ∆ + ε ≥ ≥ + ε=
   
∫
w w
w w
w w w w w
( ) { } ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
0 0
j
k k k
y ,y, ,k C \ j
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
i 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m
B 0
j j j j ij 0 0
m
m
,
max v w , y u o y
F u h w , y , w , y ,u h w , y , w , y ,..., u h w , y , w , y du
F u h w , y , w , y y , u h w , y , w , y y ,..., u h w , y , w , y y du
o y v w , y y v w , y F u h w , y
∈
+ ε ≤ + ∆
= − − −
− − + ∆ − + ∆ − + ∆
= ∆ + + ∆ − −


∫
∫
∫
w w
( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 0 0 00 1 1 1 m m m, w , y ,u h w , y , w , y ,..., u h w , y , w , y du− −
which yields
(A.9)
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B
B 0 0 0 0 0 0
j j ij 0 0 0 1 1 1 m m m
P Y ,V , y dy,J , y i,J , , y j
v w ,dy F u h w , y ,w , y ,u h w , y ,w , y ,...,u h w , y ,w , y du
∈ = =
= − − −∫
w w w w w
for ( )0 0i B \ C y , y, ,∈ w w and ( )0 0j C y , y, ,∈ w w , and zero for ( )0 0i B \ C y , y, ,∉ w w ,
( )0 0j C y , y, ,∉ w w , ji ≠ .
For j i= it follows that
(A.10)
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) { } ( )( )
( )( )
0 0 0 0 * 0 0
B B B
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
i i i i ii i i i i i k k kk B\ i
0 0
B
P Y ,V , y y,J , y J , , y i
P v w , y v w , y w , y ,w , v w , y max v w , y
P J , y i
∈
= = =
 
= = + ε > + ε  
= =
w w w w w
w
for ( )0 0ii i iy y w , y ,w= . Moreover, the expenditure function in this case has measure zero outside the
point ( )0 0ii i iy w , y ,w .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 7:
Let Z1(y), Z2(y) and 02Z be defined as in (A.1), (A.2) and (A.4), respectively. As in the
proof of Theorem 4 it follows that
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( ) ( )( )( )
( )( ).Z)y(Z)y(Zy,wvP
yy,V,Yjy,,JP
0
211jjj
00
B
00*
B
==ε+=
== wwww
Since the random terms are independent it follows that εj is independent of 02Z and Z1(y) and 02Z are
independent.
Moreover, due to properties of the extreme value distribution it follows that for given y
( )( ) ( )( ).)y(Zy,wvP)y(Z)y(Zy,wvP jjjjjjjjj =ε+==ε+
But then it follows that
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )0 00j j j j j 2 j j j j C y ,y, ,P v w , y Z (y) Z (y) Z P v w , y Z (y) P J , y j . + ε = = = + ε = = =  w w w
Q.E.D.
